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Abstract: 
Kleptoparasitism, the stealing of food items, is a common biological phenomenon that has been 
studied mostly with the help of deterministic dynamics for infinite populations. The infinite 
population assumption takes the models far from the biological reality. In this paper we provide a 
review of the main theoretical works on kleptoparasitism and then focus on the stochastic 
dynamics of kleptoparasitic individuals in finite populations. We solve the dynamics analytically 
for populations of 2 and 3 individuals. With the help of numerical solution of the dynamics, we 
were able to conclude that the behavior of the uptake rate in the population is mostly determined 
by the uptake rates at populations of 2 and 3 individuals. If the individuals do better in a pair, 
then the uptake rate is a decreasing function of the population size. If the individuals do better in 
a triplet than in a pair, then the uptake rate is a zigzag function with lows for even population 
sizes and ups for uneven population sizes. 
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Article: 
1. Introduction 
 
Kleptoparasitism is a behavior in which one organism steals food or other resources that another 
organism has caught, killed, or otherwise prepared for its own use. This process occurs across a 
great diversity of taxa, with recent observations from large carnivorous mammals [11], seabirds 
[13], scavenging bird guilds [3], insects [23], fish [14], lizards [12], snails [17] and spiders [27, 
28, 1, 18]. 
 
When considering kleptoparasitism we must ask, why would a species evolve this behavior? 
From an evolutionary standpoint the answer to this is quite logical: in order for a behavior to 
evolve in a population through natural selection, the individuals who follow this behavior must 
enjoy greater reproductive success (higher fitness) compared to others in the population, and this 
trait must be passed on to their future offspring. Since not all species that seem capable of 
kleptoparasitism show it, and since there is strong variation between and within species in the 
extent to which this tactic is used, there is a need for a predictive theoretical basis to explain this 
variation. Hence there has been a considerable body of theory aimed a predicting the 
evolutionarily stable use of kleptoparasitism in different ecological circumstances. 
 
In this paper we first review seminal theoretical papers focused on intraspecific kleptoparasitism, 
and then study the stochastic model introduced in [29] with a special focus on small population 
sizes. Almost all models developed to date are deterministic, based on a certain system of 
ordinary differential equations (ODEs). Consequently, these models assume a very large 
population size. On the other hand, the majority of model organisms that exhibit kleptoparasitism 
are birds, mammals and fish, with relatively small populations that are likely to violate 
assumptions of infinite population size models. To our knowledge, only two papers to date [22] 
and [29] proposed stochastic models for finite and thus potentially small populations. Moreover, 
[22] deal with a model that differs from the mainstream deterministic models and [29] focuses on 
situation for medium population sizes. Hence, models that can accurately describe 
kleptoparasitism in smaller population sizes are needed. 
 
2. Deterministic models of kleptoparasitism  
 
In this section, we provide an overview of the main models and summarize the major 
assumptions and conclusions of each. 
 
2.1 Holmgren, 1995 
 
One of the first models focused on intraspecific kleptoparasitism was developed in [16] and it 
used foraging interference as its basis. In this model, an individual’s behavior was deterministic, 
always fighting whenever an individual encountered another individual who had a food item. 
The model also had individuals encountered each other randomly but at a constant rate. Because 
individuals were distinct, it allowed for one to examine the effect of a given type of individuals 
who differed in their dominance over each other. But the model was very complex and only 
allowed for a numerical, but not analytical, solution. 
 
 2.2 Stillman et al., 1997 
 
In [26], the authors extended the existing behavior-based foraging interference models to 
kleptoparasitism. In their model, an individual could engage in one of four behaviors: searching, 
handling, fighting or avoiding. Their model had three key components: 
 
• the response of an individual to a competitor was not fixed,  
• individuals did not move randomly, and 
• that time was not the only currency by introducing prey as another form of currency. 
 
The authors applied the model to data collected on foraging shorebirds including oystercatchers, 
curlew, and knots. They found the model to be robust, accurately predicting interference 85% of 
the time. The authors suggested that future models should incorporate the idea that an individual 
follows optimal decision rules when deciding their behavior. Two major limitations of this paper 
include the assumptions that prey items were identical, and that the handler always defended the 
prey.  
 
2.3 Ruxton and Moody, 1997 
 
In [25], authors took the advice given in [26] and used a functional response model to bridge the 
gap between an individual’s behavior and the evolution of a population. Their approach allowed 
for an analytical solution of the model, not just a numerical one. In this model, individuals in the 
population were engaged in one of the following behaviors:  
 
• searching for a food item, 
• handling a food item, ² winning a contest over a food item, 
• losing a contest over a food item. The fight over a food item resulted when a searcher 
found a handler.  
 
The model examines an individual’s behavior over varying densities of prey and competitors and 
when there is more than one patch of food. It predicts that the proportion of individuals wanting 
to forage in the best patch will always be greater than the proportion of prey available. It also 
predicts that an individual’s decision to forage in a given patch is dependent on two things: the 
proportion of food in that patch and the distribution of food between other patches in the area. 
Two major limitations of this model were that: (1) individuals have equal competitive ability, 
and (2) any time a forager encountered an individual handling a prey item, it would attempt 
kleptoparasitism. 
 
2.4 Broom and Ruxton, 1998  
 
In [9], authors take a different tack than [25]. They divide the individuals in the population into 
three mutually exclusive groups: 
 
• searching for a food item or for a handler, 
• handling a food item, 
• fighting over the food item. 
 
They assumed that individuals can adopt different strategies (to steal or not to steal) and they 
examined what strategies can be evolutionarily stable. An evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) is a 
strategy which if adopted by a population cannot be invaded by any competing alternative 
strategy, [20].  
 
The situation can be described by the diagram on Figure 1. It should be noted that the model 
assumes that a food is a shell type (see Section 2.6), i.e., handled for an exponentially distributed 
time; and that the fights last for an exponentially distributed time.  
 
There are two main advantages to assuming the exponentially distributed time for handling.  
 
(1) One can use ODEs in the model, 
(2) The food item has always the same value until eaten.  
 
The latter is a consequence of the fact that the conditional expectation for an exponentially 
distributed random variable is the same as the original expectations. Once a handling starts, the 
expected time to finish handling is defined as Th . Provided the individual did not finish handling 
in the time t0 , then at time t0 , the expected time to finish handling is again Th . This means, in 
particular, that the individuals can fight over the food item as long and as many times as they 
choose, yet the winner always get the same food item as it would get by finding it by itself. 
 
 
Figure 1. Schematics of the deterministic dynamics model 
Using a functional response framework, the model predicts an individual’s behavior under 
varying prey densities. If food is plentiful, the model predicts that no kleptoparasitism will take 
place. Once the food density drops below a critical threshold, kleptoparasitism will occur 
whenever the opportunity arises. 
 
The model assumes that the behavior of an individual is deterministic; individuals either always 
steal or never steal, and which strategy they employ depends on either food availability or the 
time (length) of the encounter. The model predicts that individuals will cross a threshold level 
where stealing is optimal when fights are not costly and when food is hard to find. One 
peripheral assumption of the model, that a food item requires a specific handling time prior to 
receiving the energy reward, is further explored in subsequent models. 
 
The paper [9] is a foundation for a vast majority of subsequent papers. 
 
2.5 Ruxton and Broom, 1999 
 
The model in [24] examined the trade off between investing time (or energy) in finding food on 
their own or by kleptoparasitizing from others. Specifically, they examined the assumption that 
the time of a contest over a food item is fixed. Their model suggests that the ESS will be the 
result of a combination of the length of time an individual is willing to compete for a food item, 
paired with the probability of engaging in a contest over a food item. As in [9], they assume 
individuals in a population can be doing one of three mutually exclusive behaviors: searching, 
handling, or fighting. The model shows that individuals should engage in a fight over a food for 
the same amount of time as, on average, it takes that individual to find a food by itself. It also 
predicts that, in a situation where there is a trade-off between food finding ability and the 
opportunity to engage in kleptoparasitism, an individual should never kleptoparasitize. 
In essence, in this situation, kleptoparasitism is not an ESS. The paper, though, introduces the 
opportunity to test some of the explicit predictions. 
 
2.6 Broom and Ruxton, 2003 
 
In [10], the authors introduce a variant to [9] and [24] by introducing three food types: 
 
• shells 
• oranges 
• apples  
 
The shell type is a classical food model used in all previous papers and discussed in detail in 
Section 2.4. In short, a shell has to be broken in order to eat the food. If the shell is not broken, 
the expected time to break it is always the same, no matter how long one tried to open it 
beforehand.  
 
The orange type of food needs to be peeled and then it can be eaten instantly. The major 
difference between the shell and an orange is that the orange increases in value the more it is 
peeled (whereas the value of an unopened shell is constant). Hence, it pays off more to try to 
kleptoparasitize an almost peeled orange than an unpeeled orange. Consequently, one should 
kleptoparasitize when the original handler is almost done. In this case, kleptoparasitism should 
decrease as foraging density increases. 
 
The apple type of food can be eaten the moment it is found. The longer one eats the apple, the 
lower will be the value, and it is assumed that the value continuously decreases to 0. 
Consequently, it is better to attack early in the handling time and kleptoparasitism should 
increase as foraging density increases. 
 
2.7 Luther and Broom, 2004 
 
In all of the previous papers, it was assumed that the population can achieve an equilibrium, i.e., 
almost constant densities of individuals in various states. In [19] the authors examined this 
assumption and they found that: 
 
(1) at low densities, the population reaches equilibrium quickly,  
(2) at high densities the rate at which the population reaches equilibrium is influenced by the 
value of the handling time, and  
(3) when the behavioral state of kleptoparasitism is added it severely complicates model (by 
adding a nonlinearity to the system of ODEs) but that equilibrium is eventually reached. 
 
The addition of other behavioral states (such as resting/recovering) only increases the time of 
convergence to the equilibrium by a factor that is dependent on the number of behavioral states. 
Another important conclusion [19] drawn is that the speed of convergence depends upon two key 
variables: the size of the transition rate and the pattern for transition between behavioral states. In 
any case, the convergence was shown to be exponentially fast and thus this paper justifies the 
studying the kleptoparasitic population in equilibrium. 
 
2.8 Broom, Luther and Ruxton, 2004  
 
In [6], the generality of the original model of [9] was expanded in two ways:  
 
• allowing flexibility in the likelihood that an attacker will be able to successfully steal a 
prey item from a handler (originally, the likelihood was 0.5), 
• allowing attacked individuals the flexibility to surrender items without a time-consuming 
contest. 
 
Depending on the biological parameters of the model, three different types of ESSs were 
possible: one where individuals both attacked others for food items and resisted attacks from 
others (Hawk), one where individuals attacked but did not resist (Marauder), and one where 
individuals did not attack, but would resist if themselves attacked (Retaliator). Further, in some 
circumstances, more than one of these alternate ESSs was possible, depending on the history of 
the system as well as its current parameter values. The Marauder ESS is particularly interesting 
ecologically, giving an economic explanation for one individual to surrender a valuable food 
item without a fight to another individual in the absence of dominance hierarchies or intrinsic 
asymmetries in competitive abilities between individuals. 
 
2.9 Recent development  
 
In [7] the authors used the underlying adaptive dynamics model, [21] to show how and under 
what conditions the different strategies of Hawk, Marauder, Retaliator and Dove studied in [6] 
could evolve. 
 
In all previous papers it was assumed that the population consists of the same type of individual, 
i.e., every individual adopts the same strategy as anybody else. This assumption was relaxed in 
[5] where authors introduce a model where individuals can adopt any stealing/defending 
strategy.  
 
Also, until now it has been assumed that the fights over the food items are happening only 
between a pair of individuals. This assumption is not valid for a variety of animals (e.g., 
seagulls) and a model that allows fights between many individuals was developed and studied in 
[8]. 
3. Stochastic models of kleptoparasitism 
 
Unlike the case of infinite populations, there are only two papers on kleptoparasitism in finite 
populations, [22] and [29]. 
 
In [22], the authors investigate a population in which contests occur not only over the food items 
but also between any two individuals who are engaged in searching. This can be justified by 
territorial behavior of certain animals; in [22] they focused on shorecrabs Carcinus maenas, 
feeding on mussels Mytilus edulis. Their model predicts a zigzag type of functional response, 
with relatively low intake rates when the number of predators is even and high intake rates with 
an uneven number of predators. 
 
In [29], the authors take the classical model [25, 9] and modify it for finite populations. They 
were able to find numerical solutions to their model as well as derive a normal approximation 
method that can be used when the population size is not too small. 
 
In the subsequent sections we introduce and study this stochastic model in detail and derive new 
results. 
 
4. Stochastic dynamics in finite populations 
 
We consider a population of n individuals. We follow the standard model as introduced in [9] 
and adapted to finite population in [29]. Each of the n individuals can be in one of the following 
states 
 
• searching for a food item or a handler, 
• handling the food item, 
• fighting over the food item with another individual. 
 
Once a food item is found (which is happening with an average speed v f f ), the individual starts 
to handle it, i.e. preparing to eat it. The handling time is exponentially distributed, with mean Th. 
Once the item is properly handled, the item is eaten instantly and the individual returns to 
searching. If a searcher encounters a handler (which is happening at rate vhH, where H is the 
number of handlers), these two individuals engage in a fight over the food item. The fight time is 
exponentially distributed with mean Tc . At the end of the fight, one individual emerges as a 
winner and starts handling the item, the other individuals will be searching. The summary of 
model parameters and notation is given in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. A summary of model parameters (top section) and notation 
(bottom section) 
Notation  Meaning 
n  number of individuals in the population 
v f f  rate that food items are found 
1=Th  rate that food items are handled 
1=Tc  rate that fights are resolved 
vh  rate that handlers are found 
S  number of searchers 
H  number of handlers 
Pa,b(t)  probability there are a searchers and b handlers at time t 
Pa,b  probability there are a searchers and b handlers in equilibrium 
SaHbFn¡(a+b)  state with a searchers and b handlers 
f (n)  proportion of handlers in the population 
 
It is assumed that the searchers are looking for both food and handlers at the same time. If the 
food is found first, the searcher becomes a handler. If the handler is found first, the searcher 
engages with the handler in a fight over the food item. 
 
We are interested in the proportion of handlers in the population, since this has been shown to be 
proportional to the uptake rate, [9].  
 
We model the dynamics as a continuous time Markov chain. The state of the population can be 
described by a pair (a, b) where a is the number of searchers and b is the number of handlers. 
Since there are n individuals in total, the number of individuals engaged in the fight is given by 
n - (a+b) . Sometimes we refer to the state (a, b) by SaHbFn - (a+b). Only states satisfying 
 
0 ≤ a, b, (a + b) ≤ n and n - (a + b) is even (1) 
 
are admissible states of the dynamics, no other states can ever be attained. The scheme of the 
dynamics with all the transition rates is given at figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Scheme of the dynamics 
 
Figure 3. Detail of the dynamics 
 
We denote the probability that the dynamics is in state (a, b) at the time t by Pa,b(t) ; in an 
equilibrium, we denote it just by Pa,b . The probability distributions follow the following set of 
Kolmogorov equations: 
 
 
 
where V(a,b)!(c,d) denotes a transition rate between from a state (a, b) to a state (c, d) . It is 
assumed that transitions rates to and from nonadmissible states are 0. If all states (a, b) and (a§1, 
b§1) are admissible, the dynamics is described by the scheme on Figure 3 and 
 
 
 
We assume “the boundary conditions” given by 
 
Pa,b(t) = 0, if (a, b) not admissible, i.e. does not satisfy (1) 
V(a,b)→(c,d) = 0, if (a, b) or (c, d) not admissible (3) 
 
The system (2) is a system of linear ordinary differential equations. In an equilibrium, the time 
derivatives are 0 and we get the following system of linear equations. 
 
 
 
with the boundary conditions (3). The system (4) is too large to deal with explicitly. Indeed, it 
has of the order of n2 /4 equations since there is one equation for every state of the dynamics; and 
the states are lattice points filling a triangular shape that is exactly one half of a square with sides 
n√2 . However, the system (4) can be solved numerically using computer software packages like 
MAPLE. The system can be also solved analytically for some special cases. 
 
5. The uptake rate  
 
The proportion of handlers in the population is given by 
 
 
 
The function f (n) is a measure of the uptake rate in the population of n individuals, [9]. After 
conducting the numerical experiments, we conclude that the function depends on the following 
three factors only 
 
• the size of the population, n ,  
• the product (v f f Th) , 
• the product (vhTc) . 
 
The second factor corresponds to up-down movement in the diagram (searching food and 
eating), the third factor corresponds to left right movement on the diagram (looking for a handler 
and the fighting). Consequently, we may restrict ourselves to fixing Th = 1 and Tc = 1 and 
changing v f f and vh only. 
 
6. Dependence of the uptake rate on vh 
 
Notice that with the increasing vh , the uptake rate becomes sensitive to the population size being 
odd or even. When vh is relatively small, then f (n) is a decreasing function of population size. 
As vh becomes a bit larger, yet not too large, f has a local maximum at n = 3 and is decreasing 
for n ≥ 3 . As vh gets even larger, f starts to have local maxima at n = 3, 5, . . . , and eventually 
becomes a monotone function. When vh gets very large, there is a significant dependence of the 
uptake rate on the parity of the population size. Figure 4 shows the behavior of f (n) for a range 
of values of vh . 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Uptake rates for kleptoparasitic populations depends on vh. (a) vh = 0.1 , (b) vh = 1 , 
(c) vh = 2.4 , (d) vh = 5 , (e) vh = 100. Other parameter values are vf f = 1 , Th = 1 , Tc = 1 
 
6.1 The situation for large vh 
 
When vh is large, then the dynamics is pushed towards the right hand side of the diagram on 
Figure 2. The exact shape of the right hand side depends on the parity of the population size and 
it is given in the Figure 5. 
 
When n is even and vh is large, the population is almost always in the state (0, 0) , i.e., all 
individuals fighting. This means that the uptake rate is approximately 0 .  
 
When n is odd and vh large, the population is either in (1, 0) or in (0, 1) , i.e., n - 1 individuals 
are engaged in fights and the remaining one is either searching or handling. This yields the 
following system of linear  
 
 
Figure 5. Right end of the scheme of the dynamics, (a) for odd n ; (b) for even n 
 
Equations 
 
 
and we also have 
 
 
 
The equation (7) gives 
 
P0,1 = vf f · Th · Pv,1 
 
and, by (6), we get 
 
 
 
6.2 The situation for small ºh 
 
When vh ≈ 0 , then the individuals stay only in the left part of the diagram on Figure 2 since 
there are no fights. Hence, Pa,b 6≠ 0 only if 0 ≤ a = n - b ≤ n . Consequently, we have to solve 
the system 
 
 
Iteratively applying (8) yields 
 
 
and, by (9) we get 
 
 
 
The above is actually an expression for the population with no fights as derived in [15]. Notice 
that when there are no fights, the proportion of handlers does not depend on the population size 
n. 
 
6.3 Population of n = 2 versus n = 3  
 
When n = 1, 2, 3 we can solve the dynamics (4) by hand to get 
 
 
 
Clearly, 
 
f (1) > maxf f (2), f (3)g 
 
for any parameter values (there is an equality if vh = 0 , i.e., no fights). 
The inequality can be seen heuristically from the fact that once there are at least 2 individuals, 
there is a nonzero chance they will engage in a fight and thus it will lower the uptake rate. After 
some algebraic manipulation, we get that f (2) > f (3) whenever 
 
 
 
The numerical experiments moreover show that if (11) holds, then the uptake rate is 
monotonically decreasing. 
 
7. Dependence of the uptake rate on zf f 
 
As can be seen already from (11), the behavior of the uptake rate depends on both vhTc and v f f 
Th . The dependence is unfortunately highly nonlinear. Nevertheless, assuming, without loss of 
generality, Tc = Th = 1 , we can derive from (11) the following qualitative behavior. If vf f ≈ 0 , 
then (11) holds for most of the values of vh and hence f (n) is a decreasing function of the 
population size. The same is true if vf f ≈ ∞. For a fixed vh , as vf f increases from 0 to a 
threshold value V , the behavior of f (n) changes from decreasing to slightly zigzag (with local 
maxima at n = 3 , then at n = 3 and n = 5 , etc.) to a significantly zigzag functions with local 
minima at even n and local maxima at odd n . As vf f gets above the threshold V , then f starts to 
flatten out fromvery zigzag to monotonically decreasing and eventually becomes almost constant 
1 (for very large vf f ). 
 
The behavior is demonstrated at the Figure 6. 
 
The threshold value V depends on the value of vh . However, we did not find an explicit formula 
for this dependence, partially for we did not quantify the zigzag behavior (for example by 
measuring the oscillation of f ) explicitly. 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
We have seen that there is a vast literature on mathematical modeling of kleptoparasitism. We 
have reviewed significant papers on deterministic models and have seen that, starting from the 
paper [9], the model assumptions have become progressively closer to biological reality by 
allowing the individuals to exhibit a wider range of behavior, by varying the food types, and by 
allowing group fights over the same food item. Nevertheless, there was one key assumption — 
infinite population size — that remained untouched until very recently. Currently, there is only 
one published paper, [29], and one preprint, [22], that deal with kleptoparasitism in finite 
populations.  
 
Since actual populations of kleptoparasitic organisms are likely to follow the dynamics of finite 
rather than infinite populations, modeling kleptoparasitism in finite populations is an important 
problem to be addressed and solved theoretically. In this paper, we have studied the model 
introduced in [29]. We provided the analytical solutions for sizes n = 1, 2, 3 and wrote a system 
of linear equations that can be solved numerically for any population size. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Uptake rates for kleptoparasitic populations depends on vf f . (a) vf f = 0.01 , (b) vf f = 
0.1 , (c) vf f = 1 , (d) vf f = 10 ,(e) vf f = 100 . Other parameter values are vh = 10 , Th = 1 ,Tc = 1 
 
Currently, with Dr. M. Broom (University of Sussex, UK), we are working on formalizing the 
methods (detailed balance conditions for Markov chains) introduced informally in [22] and we 
hope that this will yield an analytical solution and further insight in the dynamics.  
 
From the numerical experiments, we could see that the qualitative behavior of the uptake rate 
function depends mostly on the situation in populations of 2 and 3 individuals. If the individuals 
do better in the population of 3 than in 2 , it means that the parameters are set for an old saying: 
“If two dogs fight for a bone, the third one runs away with it”, [22]; in which case an uptake rate 
function has a zigzag behavior with lows for even population sizes and ups for odd population 
sizes. It should be noted, however, that, for any parameter values, the uptake rate function 
eventually become a monotonically decreasing function when n is large enough. 
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